KABUL -- Afghanistan's run-off election will be held on November 7 as scheduled despite the withdrawal of President Hamid Karzai's only challenger Abdullah Abdullah from the contest, the election commission said on Sunday.

Afghan President's top challenger Abdullah Abdullah announced Sunday that he would not participate in the run-off presidential election set on Nov. 7.

"It is unnecessary to participate in an election full of fraud," Abdullah told his supporters in a gathering in Kabul. "I made this decision for larger interest of the country and for strengthening democracy in the country."

"This is a very tough decision," Abdullah said. "I took in a lot of consultation with our people before I made the decision."

According to the constitution, it is possible for the run-off to be held with only one candidate, but that is believed to undermine the government's legitimacy.

KABUL – Afghan presidential challenger Abdullah Abdullah quit an election run-off on Sunday after accusing the government of not meeting his demand for a fair vote, leaving doubts over the legitimacy of the next government.

A weakened Afghan government under President Hamid Karzai would also be a blow for U.S. President Barack Obama as he decides whether to send up to 40,000 more U.S. troops to fight a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan.

Karzai's spokesman also ruled out a coalition with Abdullah, dashing hopes that it might have been a way out of the impasse.

Election officials said the November 7 vote would go ahead with both names on the ballot but with Karzai the only candidate.

"Based on election laws and based on the constitution there should be a second round. The constitution is clear," Daoud Ali Najafi, chief electoral officer of the government-appointed Independent Election Commission (IEC), told Reuters.

But a spokesman for U.N. mission chief Kai Eide voiced doubt about the practicality of carrying on with the election.

"It's difficult to see how there can be a run-off with only one candidate," said spokesman Aleem Siddique.

Abdullah, an eye doctor and Karzai's urbane former foreign minister, appeared to rule out any immediate chance of a power-sharing deal with Karzai in return for withdrawing, but also told his supporters not to boycott the run-off.

His voice faltering and his eyes welling with tears, Abdullah told hundreds of supporters, including white-bearded tribal elders, in a giant tent used for grand assemblies that he had reached the decision "in the interests of the nation."

"As far as I'm concerned, the decision I have reached is not to participate," he later told reporters. "I have strong, strong reservations about the credibility of the process."

Karzai had been favorite to win the run-off after getting more votes in an August 20 first round marred by widespread fraud. His campaign team also said the run-off would go ahead.

"Dr Abdullah's decision has disappointed us," Karzai said in a statement from the presidential palace which added his team would accept whatever ruling the IEC made.

Asked later if a power-sharing deal with Abdullah was possible, Karzai's campaign spokesman Wahid Omar said: "If it means a coalition government, certainly not."

TALIBAN UNMOVED

Afghanistan has been racked by weeks of political uncertainty, with security also a major concern after the Taliban vowed to disrupt the run-off.

The Taliban said Abdullah's withdrawal made no difference.

"There will be no change of policy as far as we are concerned," Taliban spokesman Qari Mohammad Yousuf told Reuters by telephone from an undisclosed location.

Obama met his top military leaders on Friday as part of a strategic review. Some analysts were scathing in their assessment of what was seen as a flawed election staged against the backdrop of increasing violence after eight years of war.

"It is a shocking failure of efforts by the West and other international communities to build a democracy in Afghanistan," said Norine MacDonald, president of policy research group The International Council on Security and Development.

"The election should be postponed and reorganized in a manner that would yield a legitimate government and allow the Afghan people to participate effectively in a legitimate election."

A strong and legitimate Afghan government is central to the U.S. strategy to quell rising Taliban violence. Obama has already delayed the decision on the strategy and on sending extra troops to await the election result.

A spokesperson for the White House could not immediately be reached for comment on Abdullah's decision, but Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on Saturday a decision by Abdullah to pull out would not affect the vote's legitimacy.

British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said Abdullah's decision was carefully considered and that he looked forward to working with an inclusive government.

"I am confident that Afghanistan's leaders will support the remaining steps of the democratic process," Brown said in a statement.

DEMANDS NOT MET

Abdullah said he quit because demands he had sought from the government and the IEC, including the sacking of Afghanistan's top election official, had not been met.

He said there would be no demonstrations and urged his supporters "not to take to the streets, not to feel grief."

Western diplomats said that talks between Karzai and Abdullah last week on ways to break the deadlock had foundered, but Abdullah later left the door open for future discussions.

A possible power-sharing deal had also been suggested but Abdullah said no such arrangements had been made.

"This decision has not been made in return for anything or for anybody," Abdullah said.

Analysts and diplomats had seen such a deal, perhaps in return for a top post for Abdullah in Karzai's next government, as a way to spare the country further political squabbling that discredits the government and can only aid the insurgency.

The run-off was triggered when a U.N.-led investigation found widespread fraud, mainly in favor of Karzai, had been committed during the first round.

KABUL -- The top challenger to Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced Sunday that he would not take part in a runoff election scheduled for next Saturday, further clouding the country's uncertain political picture and likely leaving Karzai in power without a strong mandate to rule in the middle of a war with Taliban insurgents.

Abdullah Abdullah, speaking at a mid-morning gathering of several thousand supporters, stopped short of calling for an electoral boycott, but he did not make clear what he expects his partisans to do if the vote is held. At a news conference afterward, he repeatedly declined to predict or suggest what should happen now, stressing that his only decision was "not to participate" in the Nov. 7 runoff.

Officials of the national independent election commission said they would consult with constitutional lawyers before deciding whether plans should go ahead for the poll, which was called after reports of widespread fraud in the August election. Some analysts questioned the wisdom of holding an election with only one candidate, especially amid fears that security forces will not be able to protect voters and election workers from Taliban attacks.

Karzai's political campaign, in a statement late Sunday, said campaign officials had hoped Abdullah would participate in the runoff to "strengthen popular power" and constitutional rule. In light of his withdrawal, they said they would respect "whatever decision is made" by the election commission and other legal agencies. They refrained from criticizing Abdullah and said they hoped to "complete the election process with national unity."

If the runoff election goes ahead, it would still have Abdullah's name on the ballot, but Karzai presumably would become winner by default and take office for another five-year term.

Analysts noted that Afghan officials took pains to avoid divisive rhetoric in reacting to Abdullah's decision, clearly hoping to prevent an outbreak of political violence and implying there might still be a chance for reconciliation. By the same token, foreign diplomats and agencies portrayed his actions in a reasonable light and avoided suggesting whether or not the runoff should still be held.

The head of the U.N. mission here, Norwegian Kai Eide, said Abdullah had acted in a "dignified and statesmanlike way" during his election campaign, but that it was now important to "bring this electoral process to a conclusion in a legal and timely manner."

The U.S. embassy, in a similarly worded statement, said that Abdullah had "emphasized a commitment to serving the nation," and that U.S. officials "fully endorse his emphasis on national unity." It said the U.S. government would wait for the election panel's decision and "looks forward to working with the next Afghan administration."

Even so, Abdullah's withdrawal and Karzai's likely de facto re-election appeared to create more difficulties for the Obama administration, which has been agonizing for weeks over whether to make a deeper commitment to the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda here. U.S. officials, who pressed Karzai to accept the runoff, had been hoping the election would produce a reliable new political partner and military ally in Kabul.

Abdullah said his decision to withdraw was "final," and that he had made it this week after Karzai refused to meet several conditions to ensure the poll would be fair. Abdullah's major request was that Karzai remove the head of the electoral commission, Azizullah Lodin, whom Abdullah accused of bias and of engineering election fraud in August.

"The decision I have made was not easy. I made it not only for those who voted for me, but for everyone in Afghanistan," Abdullah said in a long, dramatic speech that was interrupted by supportive cheers. He said all Afghans "have the right" to participate in free and fair elections, but that some had been threatened with having their houses burned down if they voted for him on Nov. 7.

At a news conference later Sunday, Abdullah described a private meeting he had with Karzai Wednesday at the behest of U.N. officials. He said it had offered a "critical chance" to resolve the impasse but had failed to do so. "Unfortunately, the meeting was inconclusive, to say the least," Abdullah added, although he did not personally criticize the president.

He said he had not withdrawn from the race "in exchange for anything from anybody," but also said he would "leave the door open" for future discussions with Karzai. Some analysts said there was still a chance the two leaders could reach a compromise before Saturday.

Abdullah called his decision to quit both "tough" and "painful," but said he hoped it would help strengthen Afghan democracy in the long run. He said several times that he had purposely not used the word "boycott," which would have signaled an angry rejection of the election process. He said he planned to remain "at the service" of the country and work for the reforms he had promised in his campaign.

But some analysts suggested that Abdullah was still angling for a political power-sharing deal. And some of his aides couched his decision in more muscular terms.

"We are now a force to be reckoned with," said Ahmed Wali Massood, a close advisor to Abdullah. "No future Afghan government can continue without taking into consideration our huge force, our ideas, and our platform."

He said Abdullah's demands to Karzai had not been about "seeking employment" in a future government, but about fulfilling democratic ideals and rule of law.

For the moment, however, Abdullah's unilateral withdrawal did little to resolve a political crisis that has been building since August, when the presidential poll was marred by massive fraud. The resulting victory for Karzai was later declared invalid, and U.S. and European officials pressed the president to accept a runoff.

Some observers said they feared Abdullah's move would spark political violence, but he said he had called on his supporters "not to take to the streets, not to feel aggrieved." He said he had not asked them to refrain from voting, and that he hoped there would be a "chance for a better process."

However, he refused to speculate or express an opinion on the various possible options before the country and electoral officials, including suggestions for an interim government and a new runoff in the spring. He also refused to either endorse or reject Karzai as a future president, saying he wished to "avoid discussing hypothetical or different scenarios."

Numerous supporters of Abdullah, who gathered from across the country to hear him speak in a large tent built for mass political meetings, said they agreed with his decision to withdraw. Many said there had been serious fraud in their districts in the Aug. 20 election, and that the country needed a fair poll in order to install a new government.

"The election was full of fraud and threats, and it left the people with a lot of doubt in their hearts," said Maulvi Dar Gul, an Islamic cleric from Paktia Province. "We need to remove that doubt, because now everything in the country is stuck. We are brothers and we do not want to kill each other. Whoever wins a fair election, even a shepherd, we will accept."

Hajji Abdul Shukur, a turbaned businessman from Badghis Province in western Afghanistan, said he and his friends had flown to Kabul for the gathering because "the future of our country is at stake." He said the election commission was planning to close polling stations in his area because voters there supported Abdullah. "We need to boycott the election and set up an interim government," he said.

Several people in the tent warned that violence could still erupt if the election issue were not settled properly, but they also said they disapproved of such tactics.

"It is our hope that Dr. Abdullah will become president, but we don't want a second round because we know there will be a lot of fraud again," said Abdul Mahmad, a tribal leader from Kunduz Province in the north. "If Karzai becomes president through fraud, there will be a revolution, but we Afghans have suffered and we do not want a revolution. We want peace and democracy and law."

With the UN's reputation in tatters and Washington in denial over Abdullah's exit, Obama must turn this round or look like a loser

In Afghanistan's disreputable 2009 presidential election, everyone's a loser. Hamid Karzai's "victory", achieved by fraud and now by default, has left him a tarnished, diminished figure. The US administration that orchestrated the whole process still lacks the credible partner in Kabul it says is essential for success.

The UN's reputation for probity lies critically wounded in the gutter, a victim of inaction and bitter infighting among officials. Nato's mission looks even more rudderless and ill-defined than before. The cause of the Afghan people, bemused and terrorised by turns, is no further forward and may in truth have been set back.

US officials risked ridicule by claiming the election process remained credible, despite the decision of Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai's only remaining rival, to pull out of a second round run-off. Referring to wildly dissimilar American election precedents, secretary of state Hillary Clinton said his withdrawal did not necessarily destroy the validity of the run-off – even if only one candidate was running.

"It's not surprising that he [Abdullah] is not going to contest an election he wasn't going to win," an unnamed White House official told the Washington Post. "This is not a challenge in any way to the process of choosing the next Afghan president. This is politics." The official went on: "However this shakes out, it does not affect the legitimacy of the process."

This creative interpretation of the weekend's events ignored the fact that it was Hillary Clinton and Richard Holbrooke, the US special Afghanistan-Pakistan representative, who only a few days ago strong-armed Karzai into accepting a second round. It was essential, they said, given that his supposed first-round victory was fraudulent to the point of farce.

The White House spinners also dodged the obvious conclusion, arising from Abdullah's withdrawal, that notwithstanding all their power and influence, the US, the UN, and assembled western diplomats, plus Afghanistan's discredited Independent Election Commission were unable, in the final analysis, to ensure a free and fair vote.

Abdullah's call for the replacement of compromised election officials was ignored. The UN's wish that the number of polling stations be reduced to lessen the chance of a repeat fraud received similar short shrift. It had become clear in recent days that there was little or nothing to prevent further pro-Karzai ballot-rigging on an epic scale.

Whether the run-off will go ahead remains uncertain at this point. If Abdullah cuts some kind of power-sharing or national unity deal with Karzai, it may be cancelled and further embarrassment avoided. Or it may go ahead – but more "smoothly", given that there will be no actual contest. Some western officials seem to be privately hoping for this sort of fudge.

Peter Galbraith, a former senior American diplomat who was sacked from the UN mission in Kabul in a row over its turning a blind eye to ballot rigging, warned last week that a fraud-stained second round would be "catastrophic for Afghanistan and the allied military mission battling the Taliban and al-Qaida". For this reason, others might say, rendering a second round irrelevant has obvious attractions.

Galbraith said a Karzai second term, however achieved, would be "tainted at home and abroad". To overcome this crisis of legitimacy, he urged the adoption of reforms put forward by Abdullah that would allow greater power-sharing among ethnic groups, the election of provincial governors, increased power for local governments, and the appointment of a prime minister and cabinet by parliament, not by the president.

Barack Obama may insist on such reforms as part of his still unfinished Afghan policy review. Reducing Karzai's powers in these ways would provide a fig leaf for Washington's abject failure to secure the democratic and governmental advances that it hoped would justify ever more costly, and ever more unpopular, US and Nato military involvement.

As of last Friday, Obama, like an ivory tower professor struggling to engage with reality, was still calling for more option papers from the Pentagon on future troop levels. The latest word in Washington is that he will increase US forces, though by fewer than the 40,000 additional troops requested by his commander, General Stanley McChrystal. They will be used to defend key Afghan cities and population centres from Taliban attack. In the countryside, US and Nato forces may shift to guerrilla-style, counter-terrorist tactics.

Maybe, given time, Obama can turn things around. But his inability to prevent the US-promoted election turning into a five-star debacle was damaging. It has left him looking like something he has rarely been in his lifetime – a loser, just like everyone else. The only winners yesterday were the bad guys.

WASHINGTON — For former Vice President Dick Cheney, who wants to go all out for victory, or for Senator Russ Feingold, a Democrat from Wisconsin who wants to get out as soon as possible, the right decision in Afghanistan is easy.

President Barack Obama, and even some Republicans, wish it were that simple. The problem is many of the contentions and conclusions, on all sides, are oversimplified, even dubious.

This starts with Mr. Cheney’s charge that the president is “dithering.” How Mr. Obama responds to Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal’s recommendation to send at least 40,000 more troops to Afghanistan will shape his presidency and U.S. foreign policy for years to come. What participants describe as an intense and rigorous consideration of options isn’t dithering.

Also dubious is the contention of the White House chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, that any decision is predicated on a do-over of Afghanistan’s August presidential election. This is a nation with no history of elections or democratic institutions, and in the end, Hamid Karzai will still be president and little will have changed.

Then there’s the contention that the Taliban aren’t the enemy; it was Al Qaeda that attacked the United States on Sept. 11. True.

Yet a McChrystal skeptic like Senator John F. Kerry, Democrat of Massachusetts, a central player in the deliberations, suggests it isn’t easy to decouple these elements. For Al Qaeda, he notes, “it’s an awful lot harder to plan attacks when they are boxed in, harassed and living in fear.” Moreover, anyone who read the riveting series by the New York Times reporter David Rohde on his seven months in Taliban captivity would conclude these Islamic terrorists have a more advanced infrastructure than is commonly supposed and share many of Al Qaeda’s objectives.

On the other side, Mr. Cheney’s argument that Mr. Obama has already decided Afghanistan is a war of necessity and thus should give the generals whatever they want raises disturbing questions. Mr. Cheney, who seven years ago forecast that the Iraq war would be short and simple and declared that “the Taliban regime is out of business, permanently,” has a checkered track record.

Decision-making suffers when every action is predicated on the automatic assumption that the previous decision was correct. Four decades ago, a State Department East Asia expert, James C. Thomson Jr., devastatingly detailed how that syndrome was at the heart of failed Vietnam policies.

“The president decides, and the counselors, including the military, advise,” says Gordon Goldstein, author of a highly acclaimed biography of McGeorge Bundy, an architect of the Vietnam War who came to believe that the escalation by President Lyndon B. Johnson was mindless and relied too much on poor advice from military commanders. Today, Americans celebrate generals like General McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, and David H. Petraeus, who commands U.S. forces in the Middle East and Central Asia. These are intellectually gifted patriots. They’ve also never been elected to anything and sometimes reflect a narrow prism.

General McChrystal’s 66-page memorandum, first reported in The Washington Post, reads like a classic manifesto for counterinsurgency and advocates a tactic to defend the Afghans from “all” threats. Sending 40,000 more troops is one middle-course proposal and the one receiving the most attention.

Yet, given the size, population and complexity of Afghanistan, experts say any classic counterinsurgency strategy there could require as many as 250,000 to 300,000 American combat troops, maybe more, with significant casualties for years. That’s impossible without the sustained support of the U.S. public, which few believe would exist.

Hawks like Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, point to the 2007 Iraqi surge as a model. But the Anwar uprising was fueled by the Iraqis’ resentment of foreign terrorists, while the dreadful Taliban are native Afghans and Pakistanis. And the claims of success in Iraq may be premature, as the recent terrorist carnage in Baghdad demonstrated.

The White House insists domestic U.S. political considerations aren’t a factor in the discussions. How can they not be? Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in an interview with Fortune magazine, warned that any pullback would result in another Sept. 11. “If you want another terrorist attack in the U.S., abandon Afghanistan,” she said.

Even the biggest skeptics in the administration, in particular Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr., don’t want to cut and run. Graham Allison, a former Defense Department official who teaches at Harvard University, says there is a strong consensus among terrorism experts that Al Qaeda is planning another attack.

“In the first year of both the past two presidents, Al Qaeda has attacked on American soil,” he says, noting the Sept. 11, 2001, attack and the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. “We should anticipate they will try to make their mark again soon.”

Ironically, Mr. Allison says the threat from Al Qaeda may be heightened by the success of an Obama policy that has killed many leaders of the terrorist group in Pakistan with missile strikes by drones. “The noose is tightening, and they may want to do something dramatic before departing,” he says.

None of this makes Mr. Obama’s decision any easier. In talking to policy makers, the probability is he will settle on an increase of fewer than 40,000 U.S. troops and adopt a scaled-back version of General McChrystal’s anti-insurgency plan. The pivotal figure inside the administration is Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

All the oft-cited analogies — Iraq, the Russians in Afghanistan, even Vietnam — are imperfect. One example Mr. Obama may want to think about: that of a U.S. president who reversed his harder-line campaign posture and settled for a compromise course that was attacked by conservative Republicans as “appeasement.” That was Dwight D. Eisenhower and Korea in 1953. The United States still has 28,500 troops on the Peninsula more than a half-century later, and it’s worked out fairly well.

Albert R. Hunt is a columnist for Bloomberg News.

Election officials and the Karzai camp have insisted the vote must proceed. But Western diplomats say Mr Karzai's public insistence on rigid adherence to the rules is a protest at being strong-armed into the second round. They hope a second round which again puts Afghan voters and Nato troops at risk from Taliban attack can be avoided if the Supreme Court rules a poll unnecessary.
* Will the government be legitimate?

In ethnically fractured Afghanistan, a strong government is widely believed to be impossible without representation from Dr Abdullah's ethnic Tajik backers. He has not conceded victory, and refused to say whether he would recognise Mr Karzai. Some supporters have said Mr Karzai will be illegitimate. Threats to not recognise Mr Karzai's legitimacy are now Dr Abdullah's strongest bargaining chip in any power-sharing negotiations.

* Will a power-sharing deal be done?

In Afghan politics enemies are rarely irreconcilable. Hamid Karzai has always said he would prefer an "inclusive government", while Dr Abdullah has now said he will not close any doors to his rival. Both camps are in close contact and though negotiations stalled at the weekend they are likely to proceed. Mr Karzai's western backers have all said they would favour a national unity government.

* What does Dr Abdullah want?

He campaigned on a platform of reform to take power away from the president and his highly centralised and corrupt Kabul regime. He called for a prime ministerial system and for provincial governors to be elected rather than appointed. He has said he will continue to pursue his agenda for change even after pulling out of the race. He is not thought to want a ministerial post for himself under Mr Karzai, but instead could try to set himself up as a strong opposition leader.

* What will the result mean for the West?

The tortuous, fraud-tainted election has been called a propaganda victory for the Taliban and complicated Barack Obama's decision whether to send up to 40,000 reinforcements. After blatant fraud by Karzai-supporters, the United States has questioned whether the war can be won with a corrupt Kabul regime. The result will lend weight to Taliban propagandists who denounce the central government as illegitimate. The Nato-led coalition will seek to move on from the election as fast as possible and again focus on development and the military campaign.

KABUL – President Hamid Karzai's leadership is weak, his government corrupt and nearly a third of the votes he won in the August election were thrown out as fakes.

But in the end, the Obama administration is likely to stick by the Afghan president. It has few other good options.

Karzai is far from the strong and capable partner that Washington had hoped would emerge from the electoral process that it and Western allies had pushed for in Afghanistan. They hoped the elections would stabilize the country and bleed support from the Taliban.

But the process effectively ended in turmoil Sunday, even as the war with the Taliban intensifies. Karzai's challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, bowed out only six days before a scheduled runoff, charging that no fair election was possible.

Now the United States, barring other developments, must find a way to work with Karzai and encourage him to embrace supporters of Abdullah and other groups opposed to the Taliban.

Unless such groups are brought into the government, the Taliban are likely to grow in strength, capitalizing on widespread public discontent with the ineffectual government.

"The government is more of a headache for us than the Taliban," said Ahmed Shah Lumar, a businessman in Kandahar in the south, who complains that development plans in his area gather dust waiting for government approval.

Karzai enjoyed close ties with President George W. Bush's administration, which maneuvered him into power when the Taliban first collapsed in 2001.

But he fell out of favor when Barack Obama took the White House. U.S. officials have since been openly critical of Karzai as a weak leader, beholden to warlords whom he cultivated as allies.

Nevertheless, the Obama administration clearly concluded at some point that for all his faults, Karzai was the best it could get, given the ethnic and political realities of this impoverished country.

"We are going to deal with the government that is there," White House presidential adviser David Axelrod. "And obviously there are issues we need to discuss, such as reducing the high level of corruption. These are issues we'll take up with President Karzai."

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Saturday that Abdullah's decision to quit the race would not undermine the legitimacy of a new Karzai administration.

The runoff was called after U.N.-backed auditors confirmed massive fraud on behalf of Karzai in the first vote last August. Abdullah accused Karzai of using the resources of the government, including the election commission, to rig the vote — although the auditors never backed up that charge.

Clinton said that when Karzai accepted the runoff, "that bestowed legitimacy from that moment forward." She did not mention that Karzai agreed to the runoff only after strong American pressure, including marathon talks with Sen. John Kerry.

Now the U.S. administration must deal for the next five years with an Afghan leader whom Obama once described as suffering from a "bunker mentality" and out of touch with his own country.

"We are fed up with this government," said Kabul shopkeeper Shah Mohammad Husseini. "The situation is getting worse and worse and worse. I want a government that has the power to implement laws and doesn't deal with warlords."

Nevertheless, the options among Afghanistan's pool of potential leaders are limited.

Others such as Abdullah carry ethnic or historical baggage dating back to their roles in the civil war that devastated the country in the 1990s and led to the rise of the Taliban.

Abdullah, a former foreign minister, is widely seen as the candidate of the northern Tajik community, which accounts for about 15 percent of Afghanistan's people.

He was an ally of a late, legendary warlord beloved by fellow Tajiks but despised by the Pashtuns who are Afghanistan's majority — because of the warlord's role in the civil war. Karzai named a different former Tajik warlord as his running mate to draw off Tajik votes.

As for Pashtuns, Karzai, the son of a Pashtun tribal chief, has long held their support. That ethnic group makes up more than 40 percent of Afghanistan.

Pashtuns also form the overwhelming majority of the Taliban, and the U.S. hopes to lure away moderate Taliban members. That difficult task would likely be impossible if Afghanistan was led by a Tajik.

"If by chance Abdullah Abdullah won a runoff, that's the makings of a civil war in the country," said Thomas H. Johnson, the director of culture and conflict studies at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, in a recent interview with the Council on Foreign Relations.

Meanwhile, Westernized Afghans such as Ashraf Ghani, who ran a distant fourth in August, have the skills to run a government but lack popular support.

And none of the other Pashtuns in the race had the stature or resources of Karzai, who has effectively been in power since 2001.

Some U.S. and U.N. officials have floated the idea of a broadbased coalition or unity government, bringing together supporters of Karzai, Abdullah and other public figures to stand against the Taliban.

Western diplomats said the U.S. ambassador and U.N. mission chief held intensive talks with both sides on a power-sharing deal up to the last minute, when Abdullah pulled out.

Karzai has expressed willingness to name former opponents to his Cabinet, but has resisted a formal coalition with shared powers.

For many in Afghanistan, the idea of a coalition government brings back bitter memories of the civil war, when a governing alliance of anti-Soviet commanders fell apart, triggering four years of fighting among their factions that destroyed much of Kabul.

"I don't support a coalition government because then the president would be weak," said Sadiq Khan Baryalai, a Pashtun merchant in Kandahar.

"There would be more and more conspiracies and more and more trouble in the government," he said. "I want a strong government, a strong president, whoever it may be."

Candidate Barack Obama was widely seen as running on a peace platform. More recently President Barack Obama was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace for supposedly offering a new international approach. Yet he is considering a major military escalation in Afghanistan.

Instead, the president should rethink Washington's objective. The conflict has become his war. He should not ask, is Afghanistan winnable? Rather, the right question is what should the U.S. attempt to achieve? The goal should be to advance American security, not build an Afghan state.

The president need not rush his decision. Hawkish demagogues who entrapped the U.S. in an unnecessary war in Iraq hope to do the same in Afghanistan. For instance, Rep. Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyoming) claimed: "the lack of decisiveness about how to best proceed is emboldening our enemies and endangering our troops and friends." The worst policy, however, would be to mimic the foolish decisiveness of President George W. Bush.

Afghanistan was President Bush's "good war," in which Washington ousted the ruling Taliban for hosting al-Qaeda. But he quickly lost interest in Afghanistan, shifting Washington's attention and resources to Iraq. Conflict in Afghanistan has raged for eight years--longer than the U.S. spent fighting World Wars I and II combined--consuming nearly 900 U.S. and 600 allied lives, as well as $220 billion. The Afghan people, too, have suffered greatly.

Yet "victory" looks ever more distant. Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned that the situation in Afghanistan is "deteriorating." The government barely functions; drug money pervades the otherwise moribund economy. The number of estimated insurgents, Taliban attacks, and allied casualties all are rising. Barely a third of the territory can be said to be under the central government's (very loose) control, and even large urban areas are no longer safe. Afghan President Hamid Karzai's supporters engaged in ostentatious and widespread electoral fraud.

Indeed, the election imbroglio highlights the administration's challenge. White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel declared: "The result, for us and for the president, is whether, in fact, there's a credible government and a legitimate process." But that question has been answered--in the negative. The initial vote was marred by widespread irregularities; the fraudulently reelected president accepted a run-off only because the foreign military powers keeping him in power demanded one; no one imagines President Karzai losing even if Abdullah Abdullah reverses his decision to boycott the poll. A forced coalition/national unity government would offer little more legitimacy.

President Obama termed the war one of "necessity" and in March added 21,000 combat troops to the 47,000 Americans already stationed in Afghanistan. (Another 37,000 allied, largely NATO, forces are on station, though often where they are not needed.) Now the president's hand-picked commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, is pushing for upwards of 80,000 more personnel, with 40,000 apparently the "minimum" acceptable in his view.

The administration is worried about the political implications of escalation and is considering a compromise--adding some troops, but fewer than desired by Gen. McChrystal. However, pursuing expansive objectives without providing the necessary resources would be the worst policy. Commented Washington Post columnist Eugene Robinson: "This game's been going on for eight years. It's time to raise or fold."

But raising would not guarantee success. The allies initially deployed 60,000 personnel in Bosnia, a much smaller territory in which conflict had ceased. At its maximum Russia had 118,000 troops in Afghanistan, which proved to be too few. Even an extra 80,000 troops--which the U.S. does not have handy to deploy in Afghanistan--would not be enough. Under traditional counterinsurgency doctrine, Afghanistan, with 33 million people, many of them living in remote villages amidst rugged terrain, warrants 660,000 allied personnel. Nor is NATO reinforcement a realistic option. President Obama, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, and Gen. McChrystal all have pushed for more assistance, but garnered few commitments and even fewer boots on the ground. Europeans have far less stomach for continuing the war than do Americans.

The critical issue is Washington's objective. The U.S. long ago achieved its goal of displacing and weakening al-Qaeda (despite the failure to capture or kill Osama bin Laden) and ousting the Taliban government which gave the organization refuge. That success persists despite recent Taliban gains. National Security Adviser James Jones estimated fewer than 100 al-Qaeda members are operating in Afghanistan, and said they have "no bases, no ability to launch attacks on either us or our allies."

Ousting the Taliban was simple compared to creating "an effective and representative government," in the words of Marin Strmecki, formerly at the Pentagon, or "a national representative government that is able to govern, defend, and sustain itself," according to four scholars at the Center for American Progress, or "a credible Afghan partner for this process that can provide the security and the type of services that the Afghan people need," in Rahm Emanuel's words. Such a partner doesn't currently exist and is no where close to existing.

Everyone uses the old adage that Afghanistan is the "graveyard of empires," but outside powers never have had much success in imposing their will on the Afghan people. Nation-building is difficult enough: only in Germany and Japan, with ordered societies and democratic traditions, has the U.S. had unambiguous success. Third World states have proved largely impervious to Western attentions.

Afghanistan is no different. Afghanistan "worked" during the mid-20th century under a monarchy which understood the limits of its power. The regime respected the poor, traditional, autonomous tribal-based society which it purportedly ruled. And, most important, there were no foreign military occupiers.

Social engineering by Washington would be difficult in the best of circumstances. Afghanistan's challenges are daunting. Observed the Economist magazine: "The country's mountains and deserts are forbidding; its tribal make-up bewildering; and, after three decades of war, its communities broken, poor and ignorant. Well-meant actions often have unintended effects: fighting can create more insurgents than it kills; foreigners are blamed for attacks that hurt Afghan civilians; and schemes to win people over can deepen antagonism."

Afghanistan hosts 20 ethnic groups. Even the Pashtuns are divided into 50 tribes. This is not a society traditionally welcoming to outsiders, let alone foreigners. Afghanistan has become the world's largest opium producer. Finally, Afghan society has been badly deformed by three decades of war.

After eight years, Washington has not created the answer in Kabul. Matthew Hoh, a former Marine Corps officer who recently resigned from the State Department, explained: "Like the Soviets, we continue to secure and bolster a failing state, while encouraging an ideology and system of government unknown and unwanted by its people." Ralph Peters, a columnist who backed the Iraq war, criticized protecting "an Afghan government the people despise."

The inadequacies of the Karzai regime are manifest and multiple. The International Crisis Group pointed to "a highly centralized constitutional order in which the legislature has been denied the tools to check an overbearing executive, and a neglected judiciary, which contributes to the climate of impunity and corruption fuelling the insurgency." Malalai Joya, vilified by fundamentalists for daring to run for parliament and promote women's rights, complained: "Your governments have replaced the fundamentalist rule of the Taliban with another fundamentalist regime of warlords."

Then there is the recent flagrant election fraud, which, wrote Hoh, "will call into question worldwide our government's military, economic and diplomatic support for an invalid and illegitimate Afghan government." Karzai's allies claim that the Afghan president has learned from the experience, but what has he learned? If he can get away with rampant fraud, whether or not a second poll is held, he likely will become even less tractable. U.S. escalation will be seen as support for the existing regime, not for the sort of idealized system Washington claims to support.

No intrinsic strategic importance justifies attempting to construct a genuine Afghan state. Boston University's Andrew Bacevich explained: "No serious person thinks that Afghanistan--remote, impoverished, barely qualifying as a nation-state--seriously matters to the United States." Afghanistan's importance primarily derives from its impact on nuclear-armed Pakistan, whose largely ungoverned border territories provide a haven for both Taliban forces and what remains of al-Qaeda.

Blogger Paul Mirengoff contended that "Ceding Afghanistan to [America's main] enemy would have serious adverse implications for Pakistan." The Washington Post worried: "success by the [Taliban] movement in toppling the government of either country would be a catastrophe for the interests of the United States and major allies such as India." Others predict a veritable regional disaster if the U.S. withdraws.

However, a semi-stable, semi-workable Afghan state doesn't necessarily work to Pakistan's advantage. First, how would it affect Islamabad's most serious security concern--the regional balance with India? Pakistan strongly supported the Taliban regime pre-9/11 for a reason. Second, Afghans enjoying the benefits of peace might not welcome jihadists and
terrorists, encouraging the latter to remain in Pakistan's largely autonomous border provinces.

Most important, Pakistan seems more likely to be destabilized by an endless, escalating conflict than a Taliban advance. Islamabad's vulnerabilities are obvious, with a weak civilian government facing a complex mix of poverty, instability, insurgency, and terrorism.

Unfortunately, the war in neighboring Afghanistan exacerbates all of these problems. Argued Hoh: "Our presence in Afghanistan has only increased destabilization and insurgency in Pakistan." First, the war has pushed Afghan insurgents across the border. Second, cooperation with unpopular U.S. policy has reinforced the Zardari government's appearance as an American toady. Ever-rising American demands further undercut Pakistani sovereignty and increase public hostility.

From Pakistan's perspective, limiting the war on almost any terms would be better than prosecuting it for years, even to "victory," whatever that would mean. In fact, the least likely outcome is a takeover by widely unpopular Pakistani militants. The Pakistan military is the nation's strongest institution; while the army might not be able to rule alone, it can prevent any other force from ruling.

Indeed, Bennett Ramberg made the important point: "Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet republics to the north have demonstrated a brutal capacity to suppress political violence to ensure survival. This suggests that even were Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, the neighborhood can adapt and resist." The results might not be pretty, but the region would not descend into chaos. In contrast, warned Bacevich: "To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake."

Washington is left with only bad options. One is to continue trying to "fix" Afghanistan. Gen. Stanley McChrystal argued: "A strategy that does not leave Afghanistan in a stable position is probably a short-sighted strategy." Moreover, said Gen. McChrystal, American strategy must "earn the support of the people," which will win the war "regardless of how many militants are killed or captured."

Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations even suggested that "Poor governance is an argument for, not against, a troop surge. Only by sending more personnel, military and civilian, can President Obama improve the Afghan government's performance, reverse the Taliban's gains and prevent al-Qaeda's allies from regaining the ground they lost after 9/11." In short, failing to create a functional state after eight years of war means Washington should double down, pushing more lives and money into the growing pot.

America's well-disciplined and well-trained forces can do much, but not everything. Hoh observed that no "military force has ever been tasked with such a complex, opaque and Sisyphean mission as the U.S. military has received in Afghanistan." Even if better deployed in more heavily populated areas, the odds of reasonable success in reasonable time at reasonable cost seem long at best.

The point is not that the majority of Afghans love the Taliban. But many dislike the Karzai government, local warlords, and/or allied forces. The costs of "winning" such a complicated game almost certainly would outweigh the benefits of even the most optimistic projections. As Peters bluntly states, "the hearts and minds of the Afghans not only can't be won, but aren't worth winning." More likely than victory would be years of war, persistent insurgent activity, thousands more American casualties, hundreds of billions of dollars more outlays, persistent regional instability, and ultimate U.S. withdrawal.

What are the alternatives? The status quo offers little hope of reversing the Taliban's gains. Concentrating allied troops in the cities might offer greater urban security but would concede most of the country to the insurgency. Accelerating training and equipping of the Afghan army and police would yield positive results only if the resulting forces proved to be competent and honest, as well as competently and honestly led.

The better policy would be for Washington to begin drawing down its combat forces. The outcome might be Taliban conquest and rule, but equally likely is continuing conflict and divided governance amongst competing political factions, ethnic groups, and tribes. The resulting patchwork would be tragic, but the fighting would no longer be inflamed by outside intervention.

Would adverse consequences extend beyond the region? The Economist hyperbolically fears that "defeat for the West in Afghanistan would embolden its opponents not just in Pakistan, but all around the world, leaving it more open to attacks." However, jihadists are most likely to attack Westerners when their grievances are ongoing. Groups based in Amman, London, Madrid, and Riyadh as well as America are more likely to act if the American government is killing more rather than fewer Muslims in Afghanistan.

Moreover, escalation, followed by additional years of conflict and then ultimate defeat would multiply the harm to America's reputation. The Soviet Union made this mistake. Author Victor Sebestyen reviewed the minutes of meetings between Politburo and military officials and reported: "The Soviets saw withdrawal as potentially fatal to their prestige in the cold war, so they became mired deeper and deeper in their failed occupation." Even reformist Mikhail Gorbachev dithered out of fear of the impact on Moscow's image before finally withdrawing Soviet forces in 1989.

The most serious argument against withdrawal is that al-Qaeda would gain additional "safe havens." Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute argued that "Afghanistan is not now a sanctuary for al-Qaeda, but it would likely become one again if we abandoned it." Richard Holbrooke, the Obama administration's special envoy to South Asia, contended: "without any shadow of a doubt, al-Qaeda would move back into Afghanistan, set up a larger presence, recruit more people and pursue its objectives against the United States even more aggressively." Preventing this is "the only justification for what we're doing," he insisted.

Yet there is no evidence that al-Qaeda has moved into territory currently governed by the Taliban. Even Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would not be a genuine safe haven. Noted Stephen Walt of the Kennedy School: "The Taliban will not be able to protect [bin Laden] from U.S. commandos, cruise missiles and armed drones. He and his henchmen will always have to stay in hiding, which is why even an outright Taliban victory will not enhance their position very much."

Indeed, anti-terrorism expert Marc Sageman observed in recent congressional testimony: "there is no reason for al-Qaeda to return to Afghanistan. It seems safer in Pakistan at the moment." Other options include other failed or semi-failed states, such as Somalia and Yemen. The defuse jihadist movement which has organized most of the terrorist plots since 9/11 has found adequate safe havens even in Europe.

No wonder Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations admitted, while calling for continuing "a war effort that is costly, risky and worth waging--but only barely so," that preventing al-Qaeda from moving back into Afghanistan was "the weakest argument for waging the kind of war we are now waging." The U.S. doesn't have the resources necessary to wage war everywhere terrorists might conceivably seek a safe haven and need not do so in any case.

The administration should adjust its policy ends. Washington's principal objective
should be protecting U.S. security. The Washington Post's David Ignatius railed against adopting "a more selfish counterterrorism strategy that drops the rebuilding part and seeks to assassinate America's enemies." But the U.S. government's overriding obligation is to protect U.S. citizens, and that means focusing on al-Qaeda rather than the Taliban, forestalling and disrupting terrorist operations against America. Doing so requires sharing intelligence widely among affected nations, squeezing terrorist funding networks, utilizing Special Forces on the ground, employing predator and air strikes--judiciously, given the tragic risk of civilian casualties, which both raises moral issues and fuels anti-American sentiment--and cooperating with various Afghan forces and the Pakistani government.

In contrast, it is not necessary to build a functional state in Kabul allied with the U.S. Noted Sageman: "The proposed counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan is at present irrelevant to the goal of disrupting, dismantling and defeating al-Qaeda, which is located in Pakistan. None of the plots in the West has any connection to any Afghan insurgent group, labeled under the umbrella name 'Afghan Taliban'." In Afghanistan Washington should tolerate any regime or group, or combination of regimes or groups, willing to cooperate in preventing terrorist attacks.

Obviously, policymakers disagree on the likelihood of success of such a political strategy. One unnamed anti-terrorism official told the Washington Post that the prospects of political reconciliation are "dim and grim." Other analysts contend that only major battlefield victories would encourage Taliban forces to surrender.

Yet history suggests that accommodation is possible and certainly worth pursuing. After all, the Karzai government has made deals with warlords and narcotics producers alike. Washington once worked, reluctantly to be sure, with the Taliban regime to combat drug production. There are indications that the Taliban was angered by al-Qaeda's 9/11 assault on the U.S. Moreover, a number of Taliban commanders defected in the early years after American intervention.

Thus, Washington should attempt to split the Afghan insurgency. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once equated al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but more recently admitted: "Not every Taliban is an extremist ally." In fact, the Taliban mixes hard-core militants and disaffected residents. Arsalan Rahmani, once Islamic affairs minister in the Taliban government and now a member of the Afghan parliament, explained: "Some are fighting to go to paradise, but among the Taliban leaders most want peace. Afghanistan is their homeland and they want peace here."

The distinction is widely recognized. Newsweek's Fareed Zakaria wrote: "It is unclear how many Taliban fighters believe in a global jihadist ideology, but most U.S. commanders with whom I've spoken feel that the number is less than 30 percent. The other 70 percent are driven by money, gangland peer pressure or opposition to Karzai." Similarly, the Boston Globe quoted an American intelligence official who contended that only ten percent of insurgents were Taliban ideologues, while "Ninety percent is a tribal, localized insurgency.''

Even Gen. McChrystal advocated going "pretty high up" to give even Taliban commanders "the opportunity to come in." He added that Pashtuns "have always been willing to change positions, change sides. I don't think much of the Taliban are ideologically driven; I think they are practically driven. I'm not sure they wouldn't flip to our side."

Washington will need to display both knowledge and nuance, admittedly too often in short supply, to exploit Taliban differences. However, being out of power apparently has left the Taliban even less well-disposed to bin Laden & Co. Explained John Mueller of Ohio State University: "There are reports that Omar's group has made clear its rupture with al-Qaeda in talks with Saudi Arabia"

Thus, the Taliban may well focus on its own interests. Mullah Mutawakkil, once a minister in the Taliban government, believes a deal is possible: remove bounties on commanders, release insurgent prisoners held at Bagram air base, and accept Taliban rule in Afghanistan's southern provinces in return for a commitment not to allow use of Taliban-controlled territory in attacks on the West.

This would not be a radical policy, since Washington already has ceded certain areas to warlord control. Insurgent leaders know well that denial is less costly than control: Washington could launch targeted strikes against any al-Qaeda operations and oust any regime, Taliban or other, which allied itself with terrorists. This approach also would demonstrate to the Muslim world that the U.S. is targeting terrorists, not Islamic governments. In contrast, warns Mutawakkil: "If the Taliban fight on and finally became Afghanistan's government with the help of al-Qaeda, it would then be very difficult to separate them."

Currently joined with the Taliban are opportunistic warlords such as Gulbaddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani. Washington should appeal to differences among uneasy allies and offer to buy off--or lease--the more venal opposition.

An essential aspect of this strategy, however, is withdrawing allied troops, since many Afghan fighters are determined to resist any foreign occupiers. A continuing occupation, no matter how well-intentioned from our perspective, will generate "more casualties, irritation and recruitment for the Taliban," in the words of Nicholas Kristof.

In fact, the longer more U.S. forces remain, the harder more insurgents will resist. In 2007, for instance, 27 often feuding groups coalesced in Pakistan in response to U.S. airstrikes. In Afghanistan the population has not turned on the Taliban the way Iraqis turned on the al-Qaeda. Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis, who served in both Afghanistan and Iraq, advocated a U.S. withdrawal over the next 18 months: "Many experts in and from Afghanistan warn that our presence over the past eight years has already hardened a meaningful percentage of the population into viewing the United States as an army of occupation which should be opposed and resisted."

Unfortunately, there are limits to Washington's ability to ameliorate this result. Argued Hugh Gusterson, of George Mason University: "The Pentagon will try to minimize the insult through cultural sensitivity training and new doctrines that emphasize befriending the locals, but they will fail because it's in the very nature of counterinsurgency that occupying forces must be intrusive to be effective. And when you have thousands of foreign troops being shot at, accidents and atrocities happen. The more such troops you have, the more accidents and atrocities you get."

There remains the emotional case for escalation. Army Sgt. Teresa Coble complained to the Washington Times: "We would not be honoring the lives of the troops who died if we left here without finishing our mission." But what is the mission? One should mourn those whose lives were sacrificed by their government for any policy which failed. However, al-Qaeda has been largely defanged. The failure to create an Afghan nation is one of policy, not personnel. It would not honor American servicemen and women to needlessly toss away even more lives to continue this failed policy.

It would be especially foolish to embark upon a campaign of escalation if it is not sustainable over the long-term. And escalation is not. After nearly eight years of war, the American people are losing faith--not in the necessity of killing or capturing terrorists, but in the dream of remaking Afghanistan. The latest CNN poll indicates that six of ten Americans oppose sending more troops to Afghanistan. Nearly half want to reduce manpower levels or even withdraw all troops. A majority also believes that Afghanistan has turned into another Vietnam.

Advocates of years more of costly war for dubious gain argue that the public should support their policy, but that is irrelevant. The president must base U.S. policy on what the public likely will support. Else his strategy will be doomed from the start.

In 2002 Barack Obama warned against fighting a war "without a clear rationale and without strong international support," and that an invasion of Iraq would yield: "a U.S. occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, and with unintended consequences." That is happening in Afghanistan. In fact, one could imagine bin Laden hoping to ensnare the U.S. in a no-win war in Afghanistan. Seth Jones and Martin Libicki of the Rand Corporation noted that "combat operations in Muslim societies" are "likely to increase terrorist recruitment." Indeed, parody has become truth. "Reported" the Onion: "According to sources at the Pentagon, American quagmire-building efforts continued apace in Afghanistan this week, as the geographically rugged, politically unstable region remained ungovernable, death tolls continued to rise, and the grim military campaign persisted as hopelessly as ever."

Of course, the desire of many Washington policymakers to improve the lives of Afghans is genuine. Most Afghans want peace and many Afghans desire American aid to better their land. Given enough resources and time, courageous and dedicated U.S. personnel could conceivably succeed in remaking Afghanistan. But the chances are slim while the cost in lives and treasure inevitably would be high--too high.

Getting out of Afghanistan won't be as easy as getting in. The administration should develop a strategy to steadily reduce rather than increase America's military presence. Combat forces should be fully withdrawn. The U.S. should focus on counter-terrorism. The time and manner of getting out should reflect potentially changing circumstances. But withdrawal should be Washington's ultimate objective.

An independent America was born of a rugged determination by common folk to govern themselves. It should not surprise modern Americans that many Afghans feel the same way. Despite the persistent delusion in Washington that the rest of world desperately desires to become America's next attempt at social engineering, most Afghans are not waiting for U.S. advisers, diplomats, and soldiers to show them a better way. To the contrary, many are ready to fight to follow their own way.

Their determination presents the president with a momentous decision. The administration should narrow the Afghan mission. Washington's objective should be disrupting al-Qaeda wherever located, whether Afghanistan, Pakistan, or elsewhere. On occasion that will warrant military action, but more often other tools will be required. Even with the finest military on earth the U.S. government cannot do everything. Reconsidering American strategy in Afghanistan is an important way for Washington policymakers to acknowledge the limits of U.S. power. Changing American priorities in this way would be a giant step by President Obama towards actually earning a Nobel award bestowed more out of future hope than past achievement.